

# The 2007 Presidential Election and the 2005 Urban Violence in French Deprived Urban Areas

## What is at Stake in the Analysis of Voting Patterns in Deprived Urban Areas?

Although voting is an individual act, it is strongly influenced by the context in which the voter makes his or her choice. Whatever their individual characteristics - whether they are young or old, university graduate or not, employed or unemployed - voters behave differently depending on their place of residence. The demographic structure, social composition, economic conditions, spatial configuration, etc., characterizing the electoral environment all influence people's decisions whether or not to vote or abstain, and their ultimate choice of party and/or candidate. In this sense, electoral behaviour is necessarily territorial.

Discussions of the possible impact of the territorial context on voting behaviour are generally absent from studies of French electoral activity, despite the fact that they once held a central place in French political science (Siegfried 1913). This absence is all the more surprising given that the significance of local environmental factors has been acknowledged in numerous Anglo-Saxon studies.<sup>1</sup> For example, a study by Butler and Stokes (1969) shows that British workers who live in 'middle class' constituencies are less likely to vote Labour and more likely to vote for the Conservative party than those who reside in other types of constituencies. In the French case, the works of Braconnier and Dormagen (2007) and Badariotti and Bussi (2004) stress the importance of ecological analysis in the understanding of electoral behaviours.

The territories we have chosen to analyse in this article<sup>2</sup> are those that French public policy makers have designated as urban priority areas. Such localities are known as ZUSs *Zones Urbaines Sensibles*,\* or deprived urban areas. The 1996 law on *Politique de la Ville*\* created these zones and defined them as being 'characterised by the presence of large complexes, degraded housing and a major imbalance between housing and employment'. Approximately 8% of the population today lives in 751 ZUSs in France. The specific features of these territories constitute an ideal ground for an ecological analysis of political behaviours. Their residents in particular live under tough socio-economic conditions. According to the last census of 1999:<sup>3</sup>

- unemployment affects one out of four workers in the ZUSs (i.e. nearly twice the national average);
- more than one adult out of three has less than a primary level of education (against one out of five at the national level); and
- more than one family in four is a single-parent family (nearly twice the national ratio).

These territories made headlines in the autumn of 2005 by becoming the scene of urban violence. In the aftermath of these events, several associations called for registration on the electoral rolls – hitherto, massively incomplete in the case of deprived urban areas<sup>4</sup> – in anticipation of the 2007 presidential elections. Such activity enhanced the salience of suburban issues insofar as the political agenda for the 2007 presidential election was concerned.

Analysis of the results of the presidential election in ZUSs is interesting, not only in terms of its capacity to help us to better understand the link between territory and voting behaviour, but also to the extent that it enables us to address the possible relationship between urban violence and vote. Having outlined the scope of our study (in section 2), we will then set out the details of our analysis by examining in turn the issue of abstention (section 3) and the electoral choices made by voters (section 4) in the 2007 presidential election in comparison to the previous one (2002) and to the 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections. In section 5, we will try to determine any possible influence of the 2005 riots on voting in the 2007 presidential election. A final section is then devoted to drawing the main conclusions of the study.

### **Scope of the Study**

The principal difficulty when analysing the voting pattern in ZUSs arises from the fact that the spatial configurations of such areas does not correspond to the electoral districts they form part of. Therefore it became necessary to first reconstitute the results of the elections occurring in these spaces.

#### *(a) Identification of the Electoral Results in ZUSs*

The lowest administrative level for which electoral results are available is that of the polling station. The management of polling stations comes under the auspices of the municipal administration. The delimitation of polling stations is not controversial since any redefining of the perimeter of polling stations has to be carried out within the existing boundaries of legislative constituencies. The issues at stake in the definition of a portion of a *commune*\* as a priority area (i.e. as a ZUS) are of a completely different order, given that it enables the implementation of specific public measures in this area (e.g. tax exemption, better employment and business development and other assistance mechanisms) and leads to an increase of government funding into the *commune*. The geographical delimitation of ZUS is thus the outcome of intense negotiations between the *communes*\* and the central administration. At times they have resulted in very simple and coherent boundaries (Figure 15.1), at others, much less so by comparison (Figure 15.2).

[Figure 15.1 and Figure 15.2 about here]

Thus the spatial delimitation of ZUSs is not linked to the electoral divisions marked out by the municipalities.<sup>5</sup> In order to give an electoral identity to the ZUSs, it was necessary to classify the polling stations of the communes we studied.

The polling stations of each commune containing a ZUS can be of three kinds. They can be:

- entirely composed of registered voters residing in the ZUSs – polling stations of the BI type,
- composed exclusively of registered voters living outside the ZUS – polling stations of the BE type,
- composed of a mix of voters registered in and outside the ZUS – polling stations of the BM type.

The following diagram (Figure 15.3) helps to better understand this typology of polling stations.

[Figure 15.3 about here]

The election results that can be ascribed to ZUS voters are those observed in the BI polling stations. The comparison between these results and those from the BE stations enables us to situate the ZUS electorally in relation to the communes they belong to. The ‘mixed’ polling stations (BM) have to be excluded from the analysis as they include voters residing inside and outside the ZUS.

#### *(b) The ZUS sample*

We have constituted a randomly selected sample of ZUSs from among those having more than 1,800 inhabitants in the 1999 census (i.e. a total of 613 ZUSs out of the 751 existing ZUSs). The selection was carried out on a commune-based classification and all the ZUSs of each selected commune were included in the sample. The selection then comprised about 250 ZUS. The classification of polling stations resulted in the elimination of about 1/5<sup>th</sup> of this selection. Finally, the study sample is composed of 196 ZUSs (i.e. more than 30% of all the ZUSs in the same demographic category) belonging to 108 communes, which makes for a total of 576 polling stations entirely located in ZUSs.<sup>6</sup>

#### *(c) The Elections Covered*

The present analysis of electoral behaviour in ZUSs focuses on the 2007 presidential election. However, in order to fully appreciate the general trends, we will do a two-fold comparison: firstly, with another type of election (the 2007 parliamentary election); and second, with earlier elections (the 2002 parliamentary and presidential elections). This two-fold comparison will only be undertaken in relation to abstention patterns. With regard to voter choices, the comparison will be limited to the last presidential election. Attempting to compare voting preferences in a national poll (presidential election) with those made in a local one (parliamentary election) is rather hazardous since, in the first case, candidates are the same everywhere; whilst in the second case, voters deal with different political alternatives, depending on the electoral district in which they live, with the number and political affiliation of local candidates greatly varying from one district to another. Moreover, party coalitions change from one parliamentary election to the next, whereas some parties vanish or merge with other ones. The comparison of voter choices

between territories, between elections or over time, is thus rather difficult to interpret in the case of parliamentary elections.

### **Abstention Patterns in the ZUSs**

At the national level, turnout greatly rose at the 2007 presidential election in comparison to 2002, and then declined at the parliamentary election. We will start by determining whether abstention in ZUSs followed a similar trend. We will then try to evaluate the discrepancies in the turnout levels as well as in their trends, between the ZUSs and the rest of the communes in which they are located.

#### *(a) From the 2002 to the 2007 Presidential Election*

The upsurge in electoral mobilisation during the last presidential election was especially marked in ZUSs. In comparison to 2002, not only was there a drop in the level of abstention - more than 15 percentage points in the first round and nearly 6 points in the second round - but this feature was more apparent in ZUSs than at the national level. The abstention differential between ZUSs and the country as a whole thus decreased from 2002 to 2007 but it remained equal to more than 4 percentage points in the 1st as well as the 2nd rounds (Table 15.1).

We should further note, however, that the relative dispersion of the abstention rates in ZUSs<sup>7</sup> was greater in 2007 than in 2002, especially in the 1<sup>st</sup> round (the mean deviation between the different abstention rates in ZUSs was 25% of the average rate in 2007 against 16% in 2002). It would seem that the 2002 non-voters did not mobilise in the same proportion in the various ZUSs in 2007. If turnout rose almost everywhere (in more than 95% cases of the ZUSs comprising the sample), the increase was quite diverse from one ZUS to another, rising by as much as 28 percentage points between the two 1st rounds and up to 18 points between the two 2<sup>nd</sup> rounds.

[Table 15.1 about here]

#### *(b) From the 2007 Presidential Election to the 2007 Parliamentary Polls*

Two factors emerge from the comparison of the two types of elections that were held in 2007 (see Table 15.1, above).

First, voter mobilisation in ZUSs was much higher in the presidential election than in the parliamentary elections, with an average difference in abstention between the 1<sup>st</sup> rounds of each election amounting to 29 percentage points. Second, there was very little change in abstention in ZUSs between the two rounds of each election (- 0.3 for the presidential election, + 0.4 for the assembly polls).

The two factors highlighted here (a greater electoral mobilisation in the presidential than in the parliamentary elections, and a more noticeable difference between the types of election than between the rounds of each election) represent typical outcomes of French elections. In this sense, electoral turnout behaviour in ZUSs conforms to the one that is generally observed, even if, in terms of level, differences are more clear-cut.

The ‘odds ratios’ of electoral turnout in 2007 in relation to 2002 (see Table 15.1, above)<sup>8</sup> underline the peculiarity of the 1<sup>st</sup> round of 2007 presidential election. This round is the only one for which the chances of a ZUS voter going to the polls were larger in 2007 than in 2002. The increased mobilisation in ZUSs for the presidential election was not repeated during the ensuing parliamentary elections. The fact that the ZUS abstention rate moved closer to the national average in the 2007 presidential election cannot be thus interpreted as the beginnings of a convergence movement of ZUS voters’ electoral behaviour with that of residents of other territories.

*(c) The ZUSs and Their Communes*

The preceding developments showed that ZUSs deviate from the national average both in terms of abstention levels as well as regarding the magnitude of turnout change from one election to another. Here we ask whether or not they also deviate from the wider territories in which they are located. In order to address this question, we will look at the differences in abstention rates between each ZUS and the rest of its host commune. The advantage of this type of calculation is that it neutralises the eventual influence of communal factors (which would operate in the ZUS as well as in the rest of the *commune*\*) of the sort found in the analysis of Butler and Stokes (1969). The results are given in Table 15.2, below.

[Table 15.2 about here]

Whatever the election concerned, ZUS voters, on the whole, abstain more than the other voters of their *communes*\* (the average difference amounts to 7-8 points in the parliamentary, and 4-5 points in the presidential elections). The value of the maximal positive difference can be very high: the rate of abstention in a ZUS can hence be more than 40 points higher than that observed in the rest of the *commune*\* (in the 2007 parliamentary elections). Electoral patterns in ZUSs thus differ from the territories in which they are situated.

The odds ratios of voter turnout in and outside of ZUSs confirm this greater propensity for ZUS voters to abstain. In fact, all the odds ratios are significantly less than 1, indicating that ZUS voters are more likely to abstain than the other residents of their communes. We should note, however, that behavioural differences are less important in the presidential election than in the parliamentary equivalent.

### **Voting Trends in the Presidential Election**

For the reasons given in section 2.3, we shall only consider ZUS voting preferences in relation to the presidential elections. We will first ascertain the voting trends in ZUSs in the 2007 presidential election. Then we will study the evolution taking place between 2002 and 2007. We will conclude by comparing the ZUSs to the *communes*\* in which they are located.

*(a) The Scores Obtained by the Political ‘Families’ in ZUSs in the 2007 Presidential Election*

In the first round of the 2007 presidential election, left parties exhibited a clear lead in the ZUSs, to the extent that they totalled more than 40% of the votes and were ahead of right wing parties by nearly 20 percentage points. The centrist party came next (with 15% of ZUS votes), followed by the extreme right (10%). The extreme left is the political ‘family’ whose score in ZUS was the lowest (see Table 15.3, below). It seems that ZUS voters responded to the call for ‘useful votes’<sup>9</sup> by concentrating their votes on the main candidates of the two major parties, with Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy receiving more than 60% of the ballots between them.

[Table 15.3 about here]

In the 2<sup>nd</sup> round, Royal easily maintained her lead in within the ZUSs by winning 3 out of every 5 votes. In fact, her score was much higher (by more than 10 points) than the total votes accumulated by the left and extreme left parties in the 1<sup>st</sup> round. These surplus votes probably came from a split in the votes received by François Bayrou (the centrist candidate) in the 1<sup>st</sup> round. If we assume that there was a ‘perfect’ transference of votes between the two rounds - that is, all the left and extreme left votes being transferred to Ségolène Royal and all the right and extreme right votes to Nicolas Sarkozy, then 75 per cent of the votes of the centrist candidate in the ZUSs would be passed on to the left candidate.

*(b) Evolution of Voting Patterns from the Previous Presidential Election*

At the national level, the 2007 presidential election was chiefly marked by three evolutionary departures from trends shown in the previous election: the implementation of the ‘useful vote’ strategy, which resulted in the elimination of minor candidates; the breakthrough made by Bayrou; and the decline of the extreme right. These evolutions can also be seen in the ZUSs incorporated in our sample (see last columns of Table 15.3, above).<sup>10</sup>

In ZUSs, as in the country as a whole, the centrist party represented by Bayrou, improved its score by more than 10 percentage points, while the two extreme parties, both left and right, showed a marked decline (3-4 points for the extreme left and 9-10 points for the extreme right).<sup>11</sup> In ZUSs as elsewhere, right wing parties gained points whereas the left regressed. At the national level the progress made by right-wing parties was of the same order as the decline of left parties (around 3 percentage points), while in ZUSs, gains by the right were disproportionately larger than losses incurred by the left.

*(c) The ZUSs and Their Communes*

Table 15.4 compares the average score of the different candidates in the 2007 presidential election within ZUSs with the scores they achieved in the rest of the *communes*\* in which the ZUSs are located.

[Table 15.4 about here]

We will start by observing that the scores recorded in the rest of the *communes*\* in which ZUSs are situated do not conform to the national averages.<sup>i</sup> ZUSs are located in communes whose voters are more inclined to vote for the left - and less so for the right - than the average French voter. This characteristic is reinforced for ZUS voters in comparison to voters living in the rest of their communes. Hence, the left performed much better in ZUSs than in the rest of the communes, while the right made a relatively poor showing, with an average difference, in both cases, of around 8 percentage points in the 1<sup>st</sup> round of the 2007 presidential elections and nearly 10 in the 2<sup>nd</sup> round. Extreme parties also registered better scores in ZUSs (+1.5 points of difference for the extreme left and for the extreme right) at the expense of the centrist party (approximately -4 points). The calculation of the odds ratios clearly shows that the ZUS voters were less attracted by right and centrist candidates, compared to the other voters in their *communes*.<sup>ii</sup>

Despite this, voting patterns exhibited in ZUSs are not unconnected with those of the *communes*\* to which they belong. Thus, ZUSs that vote more for extreme parties (right or left) tend to belong to *communes* that also vote more for these same parties, with the correlation between the ZUS and the *communes* votes being the largest for extreme parties.

Finally, concerning the evolution of the difference in electoral choices between the residents of the ZUSs and of the rest of their *communes*\* between the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections, we note that the difference has only increased for left votes (see last column of Table 15.4). The left has regressed more in the rest of the communes than in the ZUSs, such that the difference has increased (by more than 4 points). Conversely, the scores achieved by the right in the ZUSs came closer to those realized in the rest of the communes, with the right votes having increased more in the ZUSs than in the wider communes. For the other three political groups, there was very little variation in the difference of votes in and outside of ZUSs from 2002 to 2007.

### **The 2007 Presidential Election in ZUSs and the 2005 Urban Riots**

Urban deprived areas provided a fertile ground for the riots that occurred in France towards the end of 2005. These incidents gave a boost to electoral mobilisation campaigns by voluntary associations working in such neighbourhoods and ensured that the suburbs featured high on the 2007 electoral agenda. It is therefore especially pertinent to assess whether or not the 2005 riots may have influenced electoral behaviours in the ZUSs in which they occurred.

The study proposed here of the relations between the results of the 2007 presidential election and the 2005 urban violence in ZUSs is carried out by using the ordinary least squares method of regression. The conclusions will be presented once we have described the indicators of urban violence and the methodology employed in our analysis.

#### *(a) Methodology*

The urban violence occurring late in 2005 is measured according to statistics compiled by the national police administration from the 27<sup>th</sup> of October to the 20<sup>th</sup> of November 2005. Three types of violent offences are listed:

- the number of burnt cars
- destruction of, or damage to, *public* property
- destruction of, or damage to, *private* property.

We consider that the sum of these three categories constitutes 'urban violence'. In those ZUSs in our sample for which this data is available,<sup>iii</sup> the burning of cars accounted for the majority of the incidents recorded (72%), the destruction of private property about 15% and the destruction of public property a little less than 12%.

We also use an indicator of the intensity of the riots, defined for each ZUS as the share of the autumn urban violence in the overall 'expressive' delinquency that occurred in the year 2005.<sup>iv</sup>

Our chosen method of analysis involves regressing<sup>v</sup> each electoral variable observed in the 1<sup>st</sup> round of the 2007 presidential election (i.e. rate of voter turnout and scores of political parties) on two other variables, namely the same electoral variable, but observed in the 1<sup>st</sup> round of the 2002 presidential election, and one of the indicators of urban violence (i.e. either one of the offence categories or the sum of them expressed in terms of rate per 1,000 inhabitants, or the indicator of riot intensity). This rigorous and simple approach is based on the hypothesis that a certain type of electoral result observed in the 1<sup>st</sup> round of the 2007 presidential election is largely explicable in terms of the corresponding result observed in the 1<sup>st</sup> round of the previous presidential election, and by the level of urban violence in 2005. By introducing the lagged value of the dependent variable in the regression, we were able to account for the influence of the structural factors of electoral behaviours whose impact varies little from one election to another.

It should be stressed that our analysis is carried out on aggregated data (per ZUS) and not on individual data. This characteristic has important implications for the interpretation of the results. Indeed, it precludes the drawing of any conclusions concerning individual behaviours. The correlations arrived at are calculations involving entire entities - e.g. between the turnout registered in a ZUS and the rate at which certain types of offence occurred within it at the time of the riots. But the correlations between the individual observations forming these wholes cannot be determined. If, for example, the rate of turnout is negatively linked to that of car burning, we can in no way infer that the typical perpetrators of this kind of infraction were apt to abstain more than any others. The correlation merely signifies that in ZUSs, the level of turnout is lower the higher the rate of the car-burning that occurred.

Moreover, the veracity of the estimated results is dependent on the validity of the indicators of urban violence we employed. Crime statistics issued by the police have to be taken with a high level of caution, since they say more about what the police do and are told to do, than they do about the actual crime.<sup>vi</sup>



*(b) The Impact of the 2005 Riots on Voting in the 2007 Presidential Election*

The results of the regressions are presented in Table 15.5.

[Table 15.5 about here]

Voter turnout in the 2007 presidential election in ZUSs does not seem to have been affected by the overall level of urban violence in 2005, even if the rate of damage to private property had a significantly negative impact. On the contrary, the intensity of the 2005 riots had a positive effect on voter turnout. All other things being equal, in ZUSs where violence was particularly severe (in comparison with the usual level of delinquency prevailing in the ZUS), turnout in the 2007 presidential election was also greater.

This increase in turnout in the ZUS where riots were more intense did not benefit the extreme right party. In fact, quite the opposite occurred. The extreme right recorded lower scores in ZUSs where the number of incidents per 1,000 inhabitants was higher. Conversely, the left scored better in ZUSs where the level of violence was more salient.

### **Conclusions**

The preceding analysis of the results of the 2007 presidential election enables us to highlight several observations regarding electoral behaviours in ZUSs. The first two are concerned with voter turnout and the following two with voter choices.


1. The level of abstention in ZUSs was higher than the national average and also exceeded that occurring in the rest of the communes in which the ZUSs are located.
2. The abstention patterns of ZUS voters differ according to the type of election. ZUS residents mobilise themselves for elections of prime importance, such as the presidential election, but appear less concerned about more local, and less personalised, elections. This selective abstention, which varies according to the type of election, is common to all voters. However it is more pronounced among ZUS voters.
3. Within ZUSs, there was a clear swing in favour of the left and - more so than anywhere else - right-wing candidates. Centrist candidates, by contrast, tended to receive fewer votes. This was a constant trend in ZUSs, whatever the election.
4. There was an evolution in voter preferences in the 2007 presidential election towards useful voting' strategies. This tendency, which was just as evident in ZUSs as elsewhere, led to the elimination of minor candidates, the breakthrough made by centre Bayrou, and the decline of the extreme right.

Finally, as a result of our close examination, we can safely say that ZUS voters are just like any others. The electoral results recorded in ZUSs are no doubt special (cf. points 1 and 3). But the evolution from one election to another is the same as elsewhere (cf.

points 2 and 4). We can therefore consider that the specific features of ZUS electoral results are above all a consequence of the singularity of these territories, and that they are related to the special characteristics of the environment confronted by the residents of the ZUSs.


The analysis of the impact of urban violence on voting in the ZUSs leads to the same sort of conclusion. It would seem that the riot episode had a local impact on the electoral choices in the presidential election that followed. In places where the explosion of violence was particularly severe compared to the usual level of delinquency, a greater number of voters went to the polls for the presidential election and these voters were less inclined to vote for the extreme right.

There are not enough elements to undertake a more detailed interpretation of these correlations. Data is scarce at the level of the deprived neighbourhoods. This is truly unfortunate, for a much deeper understanding of implications of these life spaces for political understanding and behaviour would provide us with even more interesting insights than we have been able to unravel here.




**Figure 15.1** Example of a simple spatial delimitation of a ZUS. ZUS Les Prés de Montigny-le-Bretonneux (Yvelines)

Source: *Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville (DIV)* ; <http://i.ville.gouv.fr/>



**Figure 15.2** Example of a complex spatial delimitation of a ZUS. ZUS ‘Hauts de Garonne-Bastide (Queyries-Brazza)’ belonging to the communes of Bordeaux, Cénon, Floirac and Lormont

Source : Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville (DIV) ; <http://i.ville.gouv.fr/>



**Figure 15.3** The classification of the polling stations in a given commune

	<b>Presidential</b>			<b>Parlia- mentary</b>	<i>Difference</i>
	2002	2007	<i>Difference</i> 2007/2002	<b>2007</b>	<i>Parl.</i> <i>/Presid.</i>
<b>1<sup>st</sup> round</b>					
Average rate*	36.0%	20.8%	-15.2	49.9%	+29.1
Minimum rate	22.7%	12.2%	-10.5	33.7%	+21.5
Maximum rate	64.9%	52.3%	-12.6	86.4%	+34.1
Coefficient of variation	0.159	0.249	+0.09	0.145	-0.104
Difference ZUS – France (in points %)	7.6	4.6	-3.0	10.4	+5.8
Odds ratios of turnout in 2007 compared to 2002		1.24		0.90	
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> round</b>					
Average rate*	26.2%	20.5%	-5.7	50.3%	+29.8
Minimum rate	16.0%	12.6%	-3.4	35.0%	+22.4
Maximum rate	48.2%	46.2%	-2.0	77.8%	+31.6
Coefficient of variation	0.192	0.218	+0.03	0.137	-0.081
Difference ZUS – France (in points of %)	5.9	4.5	-1.4	10.3	+5.8
<u>Odds ratios of turnout in 2007 compared to 2002</u>		1.08		0.97	

**Table 15.1 Evolution of abstention in ZUSs**

\* The average rates correspond to the average of the abstention rates observed in the ZUSs. Taking account of the fact that polling stations have a similar number of registered voters, this simple average is very close to a weighted average.

	Parliamentary		Presidential	
	2002	2007	2002	2007
<b>1<sup>st</sup> round</b>				
Maximal positive difference	24.4	43.6	33.1	30.1
Maximal negative difference	-8.3	-7.1	-7.7	-5.7
Average difference	7.6	7.8	5.3	4.1
Coefficient of variation	0.79	0.85	1.05	1.04
<i>Coefficient of correlation ZUS / outside ZUS**</i>	<i>0.42</i>	<i>0.41</i>	<i>0.35</i>	<i>0.58</i>
Odds ratios of turnout in ZUS / outside ZUS	0.84	0.83	0.91	0.93
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> round</b>				
Maximal positive difference	32.8	36.0	23.2	25.1
Maximal negative difference	-7.1	-6.7	-6.2	-5.0
Average difference	7.0	6.6	4.5	3.7
Coefficient of variation	0.88	0.89	0.98	1.05
<i>Coefficient of correlation ZUS / outside ZUS**</i>	<i>0.47</i>	<i>0.54</i>	<i>0.52</i>	<i>0.52</i>
Odds ratios of turnout in ZUS / outside ZUS	0.86	0.85	0.92	0.94

**Table 15.2** Abstention in and outside of ZUSs.

\* The differences are calculated as the difference, for each ZUS, between the abstention rate in the ZUS and in the rest of the commune.

\*\* The coefficients of correlation are all significant at the 1 percent level.

<i>In % of expressed votes</i>	ZUSs		France		Difference 2007 – 2002 (1 <sup>st</sup> round)	
	1 <sup>st</sup> round	2 <sup>nd</sup> round	1 <sup>st</sup> round	2 <sup>nd</sup> round	ZUSs	France
Extreme left	8.3		7.1		-3.8	-3.3
Left	42.6		29.4		-1.2	-3.0
<i>S. Royal</i>	38.5	62.2	25.9	46.9	+16.8	+15.0
Centre	14.8		18.6		+10.4	+11.8
Right	23.6		34.5		+4.5	+3.4
<i>N. Sarkozy</i>	21.9	37.8	31.2	53.1	+7.1	+11.3
Extreme right	10.6		10.4		-9.9	-8.8

**Table 15.3** Results of the 2007 presidential election in the ZUSs

*Note:* In the 2007 presidential election, the extreme left includes O. Besancenot, J. Bové, A. Laguiller and A. Schivardi ; the left includes M.-G. Buffet, S. Royal and D. Voynet ; the centre F. Bayrou ; the right P. de Villiers, F. Nihous and N. Sarkozy ; the extreme right J.-M. Le Pen.

In 2002, L. Jospin was the candidate of the main left party (Socialist Party) and J. Chirac the candidate of the main right party (RPR).

	ZUS		Outside ZUS		Odds ratios ZUS / outside ZUS*		Change in the difference ZUS - outside ZUS compared to 2002 **
	1 <sup>er</sup> tour	2 <sup>nd</sup> tour	1 <sup>er</sup> tour	2 <sup>nd</sup> tour	1 <sup>er</sup> tour	2 <sup>nd</sup> tour	
Extreme left	8.3		6.7		1.56		-0.5
Left	42.6		34.5		1.34		+4.2
<i>S. Royal</i>	38.5	62.2	30.3	50.6		1.30	
Centre	14.8		18.5		0.67		-0.8
Right	23.6		31.2		0.77		-2.6
<i>N. Sarkozy</i>	21.9	37.8	29.1	49.4		0.72	
Extreme right	10.6		9.1		1.35		-0.5

**Table 15.4** Scores in and outside of the ZUSs in the 2007 presidential election.

\* Meaning of the odds ratios: OR > 1: a voter registered in ZUS is more likely to vote for the political group than a voter leaving outside ZUS. OR < 1: a voter registered in ZUS is less likely to vote for the political group than a voter leaving outside ZUS.

\*\* This column gives the average change, between the first rounds in 2002 and in 2007, in the difference for each ZUS between the score of the political group in the ZUS and its score outside the ZUS.

		<i>Electoral variable (1<sup>st</sup> round of the 2007 presidential)</i>				
		Turnout rate	Extreme left votes	Left votes	Right votes	Extreme right votes
<i>Rate/1000 inhabits.</i>	Burning of cars	<b>n. s.</b>	<b>n. s.</b>	+ *	<b>n. s.</b>	- ***
	Damages to public property	<b>n. s.</b>	<b>n. s.</b>	<b>n. s.</b>	<b>n. s.</b>	<b>n. s.</b>
	Damage to private property	- **	<b>n. s.</b>	+ *	- **	<b>n. s.</b>
	2005 autumn urban violence	<b>n. s.</b>	<b>n. s.</b>	+ **	<b>n. s.</b>	- ***
<i>Intensity of the 2005 autumn urban violences</i>		+ ***	<b>n. s.</b>	<b>n. s.</b>	<b>n. s.</b>	- **

**Table 15.5** Results of the estimation of the impact of urban violence

*n.s.*: the coefficient is not statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*\* (*resp.* \*\* and \*) indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (*resp.* 5 and 10% level). The R<sup>2</sup> varies between 0.41 (for the estimation of the extreme left votes) and 0.67 (for the estimation of the left votes). The number of observations varies between 130 and 156 due to data availability.



<sup>1</sup> See Fauvelle-Aymar and François (2006) for a list of these works. See also Darmofal (2006) for a description and analysis of electoral turnout based on aggregate data.

<sup>2</sup> And which have been the subject of several studies by the authors, see Fauvelle-Aymar, François and Vornetti (2005, 2006).

<sup>3</sup> These are the most recent figures available for ZUSs.

<sup>4</sup> See especially Pan Ké Shon (2004), who shows that the different positions with regard to electoral registration are due to the individual characteristics of the residents of these neighbourhoods.

<sup>5</sup> It can even happen that a ZUS spans several communes. This can be seen, for example, in the ZUS Hauts de Garonne-Bastide that stretches across four communes (Bordeaux, Cenon, Floirac and Lormont). The contours of the ZUS are shown in Figure 2.

<sup>6</sup> The list of towns and ZUSs in our sample can be found on the following web site: [<http://ses.telecom-paristech.fr/francois/supports/listeZUS.pdf>].

<sup>7</sup> As measured by the coefficient of variation.

<sup>8</sup> The odds ratio is obtained by comparing the occurrence of a particular phenomenon (electoral turnout) between two groups or, as in this case, at two different moments (in 2002 and 2007). It is defined as

$$OR = \frac{p_1/(1-p_1)}{p_2/(1-p_2)} = \frac{p_1(1-p_2)}{p_2(1-p_1)}$$

with  $p_1$  being the rate of turnout in ZUS in 2007 and  $p_2$  in 2002. If the OR is

equal to 1, then the chances of ZUS voters going to the polls are the same in 2002 as in 2007. If it is less (resp. greater) than 1, there are fewer (resp. more) chances of ZUS voters going to the polls in 2007 than in 2002.

<sup>9</sup> The ‘useful vote’ is a mobilisation rhetoric used in this election by the Socialist Party to rally voters. In 2002, the Socialist party candidate, Lionel Jospin (the incumbent Prime Minister) did not obtain the required number of votes to maintain his candidature in the 2<sup>nd</sup> round. The two who qualified were the right wing candidate, Jacques Chirac, and the extreme right candidate, Jean-Marie Le Pen. The explication given afterwards by the Socialist Party was that many leftist voters had voted for other left wing candidates or for extreme left candidates in the 1<sup>st</sup> round.

<sup>10</sup> The comparison here only relates to the 1<sup>st</sup> round in view of the atypical circumstances of the 2<sup>nd</sup> round of the 2002 presidential election, which pitted a right wing candidate (J. Chirac) against an extreme right candidate (J.-M. Le Pen).

<sup>11</sup> The odds ratios of vote choices in ZUS in 2007 as compared to 2002 confirm these changes:

	Extreme L	Left	Centre	Right	Extreme R
OR 2007/2002	0.67	1.01	3.35	1.16	0.48

Thus there was 3 times more chance of a ZUS voter voting for the centrists in 2007 than in 2002, and 50% less chances that s/he would vote for the extreme right.

<sup>i</sup> See Table 3 for national scores.

<sup>ii</sup> The comparison between voting patterns of ZUS residents and those of voters living in the rest of the communes leads to the same conclusions with respect to the 2007 parliamentary elections. The limits indicated above (sections 2.3) do not apply here, given that the two types of voters are confronted with the same political offer.

<sup>iii</sup> That is in 156 ZUSs.

<sup>iv</sup> ‘Expressive’ delinquency comprises offences that are not aimed at the appropriation of somebody’s property (robbery), but which involve damage to property (mutilation, destruction) and assault on persons symbolising authority (such as policemen). They are listed by the police and gendarmerie services in a statistical table called *État 4001*. It should be noted that our indicator of the riots intensity constitutes an approximate measure given that the various types of offences included under ‘expressive’ delinquency are not the same as those figuring in the urban violence category.

<sup>v</sup> Using the ordinary least squares method.

<sup>vi</sup> For a discussion of the problems caused by the measurement of crime, see in particular Collectif (2004), Névanen *et al.* (2006) and Robert (2008). In France, unlike in Great Britain (and its British Crime Surveys), police statistics are used to measure crime and delinquency nationwide, and not victimization surveys.